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ABSTRACT. This Note joins a growing chorus of scholarship criticizing the lack of
proportionality analysis in the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Rather than
simply bemoan the current state of legal doctrine, we offer a practical test that state and federal
courts could use to determine the permissible scope of pedestrian stop-and-frisks. Specifically,
we propose that courts adopt an offense-severity model that distinguishes minor offenses (like
jaywalking, public alcohol consumption, and simple trespass) from more serious misdemeanors
and felonies. Two state supreme courts -Massachusetts's and Washington's -have already
adopted part of our approach, distinguishing noncriminal from criminal activity for the purposes
of stop-and-frisks. That is, police in those states may not engage in stop-and-frisks based on
mere suspicion of noncriminal offenses. Our Note further advocates for a rebuttable
presumption against stop-and-frisks for petty misdemeanors. To overcome this presumption,
prosecutors would bear the burden of demonstrating that an officer reasonably believed the
suspected offense posed an immediate threat to public safety. In advocating such a model, our
Note contributes to a broader debate about crime-severity's usefulness as a rubric for assessing
police conduct under the Fourth Amendment and its state law equivalents.
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INTRODUCTION
In the mid-199os, the New York City Police Department (NYPD)
embraced a new strategy for crime suppression predicated on James Q. Wilson
and George Kelling's "broken windows" criminological theory.' The basic
thrust of that strategy has now been adopted in some form by hundreds of
police departments across the country 2 Known as "order-maintenance
policing," the strategy calls for a zero tolerance policy towards so-called
"quality of life" offenses whose occurrence is thought to reflect crime-
generating social disorder.' In departments that follow an order-maintenance
approach, officers aggressively enforce city ordinances against activities like
panhandling, public drunkenness, graffiti, prostitution, and loitering.4 The
explicit aim of order-maintenance policing is to "reclaim" the streets in order to
"undercut the ground on which more serious crimes seem possible and even
permissible." 5  Practically speaking, it often means using aggressive
enforcement of quality of life violations as a pretext to seize weapons or other
contraband.'
One of the primary legal mechanisms for effectuating order-maintenance
policing is the stop-and-frisk. 7 A stop-and-frisk is a nonconsensual encounter
between police and citizen that falls short of a full-blown arrest. The Supreme
Court first recognized the procedure's constitutional legitimacy in Terry v.
1. James Q Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood
Safety, ATLANTIC, Mar. 1982, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/o3/broken
-windows/3o4465; see also Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows:
Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 461-64 (2000)
(discussing NYPD's embrace of order- maintenance policing).
2. David Thacher, Order Maintenance Reconsidered: Moving Beyond Strong Causal Reasoning, 94
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 381, 385 (2004).
3. Fagan & Davies, supra note i, at 457, 461-62, 477.
4. N.Y.C. POLICE DEP'T, POLICE STRATEGY No. 5: RECLAIMING THE PUBLIC SPACES OF NEW
YoRK 5 (1994) [hereinafter POLICE STRATEGY No. 5]; see also CIVIL RIGHTS BUREAU, OFFICE
OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. OF THE STATE OF N.Y., THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENTIS
"STOP & FRISK" PRACTICES 141-42 tbl.II.A.I (1999) [hereinafter OAG REPORT] (listing
offenses).
5. POLICE STRATEGY No. 5 , supra note 4, at 7.
6. As one early report on stop-and-frisk practices noted, police reasoned that "[s]topping
people on minor infractions also made it riskier for criminals to carry guns in public" and
that "some of the persons arrested on minor charges would have open warrants for more
serious crimes." ROBERT C. DAVIS & PEDRO MATEU-GELABERT, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE,
RESPECTFUL AND EFFECTIVE POLICING: Two EXAMPLES IN THE SOUTH BRONX 1 (1999)
[hereinafter VERA REPORT].
7. Fagan & Davies, supra note 1, at 475.
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Ohio.' To make a Terry stop, an officer need only have reasonable grounds for
believing that "criminal activity may be afoot."9 A limited search of the
suspect's person (the "frisk") is similarly permissible so long as the officer
reasonably believes the suspect is armed and dangerous.o Subsequent case law
has clarified that pretextual motivations for executing a stop-and-frisk are
irrelevant." Courts are directed to apply an objective standard in reviewing
such encounters. 2
Challenges to stop-and-frisk policies in recent years have proven successful.
In 2011, Philadelphia chose to accept judicial monitoring of stops rather than
contest an ACLU lawsuit." The following year, Seattle did the same in
response to a Department of Justice investigation. And, most significantly, in
August 2013, a federal district court judge granted a preliminary injunction
against the NYPD's stop-and-frisk program." In her controversial Floyd v. City
of New York ruling, Judge Shira A. Scheindlin found the city had been
deliberately indifferent to an unconstitutional policing policy that (1) permitted
stop-and-frisks to be made on less than reasonable suspicion and (2) utilized
racial classifications to determine whom to stop-and-frisk.16
The time is ripe, then, to reconsider the purported legal justification
underlying aggressive stop-and-frisk practices. This Note asks one narrow, but
8. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
q. Id. at 30.
lo. Id.
ii. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 8o6, 813 (1996) ("Subjective intentions play no role in
ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.").
12. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (analyzing a traffic stop's
reasonableness using an objective test).
13. Settlement Agreement, Class Certification, and Consent Decree, Bailey v. City of
Philadelphia, No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 2011).
14. Settlement Agreement and Stipulated (Proposed) Order of Resolution, United States v. City
of Seattle, No. 12-CV-1282 (W.D. Wash. July 27, 2012).
15. Floyd v. City of New York, No. o8 Civ. 1034, 2013 WL 4046209 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013).
16. Id. at *70-74. In October 2013, a Second Circuit panel stayed Judge Scheindlin's order
pending the city's appeal. See In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d 118, 130 (2d Cit. 2013).
In its order, the Second Circuit panel found Judge Scheindlin had "compromised" the
appearance of impartiality by inviting plaintiffs to file the stop-and-frisk suit in her court
and by giving interviews to various media outlets. Id. Consequently, the panel remanded the
case with orders that it be assigned to a new, randomly selected, district judge. Id. at 131. In
January, the city's new mayor, Bill de Blasio, announced that the city would withdraw its
appeal and agree to the reforms ordered by Judge Scheindlin. Benjamin Weiser & Joseph
Goldstein, Mayor Says New York Will Settle Suits on Stop-and-Frisk Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
30, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2o14/ol/31/nyregion/de-blasio-stop-and-frisk.html.
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exceedingly important, question about the stop-and-frisk: should officers be
able to stop individuals on the basis of any suspected offense, no matter how
minor? As the leading treatise on Fourth Amendment law notes, this question
"has seldom been confronted head on by the lower courts."11 Ordinarily, courts
limit their inquiries to whether officers have reasonable suspicion that an
offense is being, has been, or is about to be committed, regardless of its
severity." We argue that such an approach is both unfaithful to Terry's
reasoning and misguided as a matter of policy.
In so arguing, we join a growing chorus of academic voices criticizing the
lack of proportionality in the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.' 9 As these scholars have persuasively shown, the Court's
"transsubstantive" approach to search and seizure law ill suits the Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness requirement.2o After all, how can courts strike a
proper "balance between the public interest and the individual's right to
personal security" ' without taking into account the seriousness of the offense
the government seeks to investigate?
Where the scholarly literature has fallen short, however, is in proposing an
offense-severity test that is workable both on the streets and in the courtroom.
As Professor Eugene Volokh has noted: "[T]he devil is in the details. If courts
can't make the severity distinctions work in practice, then the distinctions'
17. 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
5 9.2(C) (5th ed. 2012).
18. See, e.g., State v. Kennedy, 726 P.2d 445, 448 (Wash. 1986) ("While there has been some
dispute among critics, courts have not required the crime suspected or under investigation
to be a felony or serious offense." (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981)
(upholding a vehicle stop based on officers' reasonable suspicion of illegal entry))).
19. E.g., Jeffrey Bellin, Crime-Severity Distinctions and the Fourth Amendment: Reassessing
Reasonableness in a Changing World, 97 IOWA L. REv. 1 (2011); Vicki C. Jackson, Being
Proportional About Proportionality, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 803, 849 n.145 (2004); William J.
Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 842 (2001); Eugene Volokh, Crime Severity and Constitutional Line-Drawing, 90 VA. L.
REV. 1957, 1964 (2004).
20. See, e.g., Bellin, supra note 19, at 4-5; Stuntz, supra note 19, at 870; Volokh, supra note 19, at
1958; see also William A. Schroeder, Factoring the Seriousness of the Offense into Fourth
Amendment Equations -Warrantless Entries into Premises: The Legacy of Welsh v. Wisconsin,
38 U. KAN. L. REV. 439, 536 (1990) ("One relevant factor in evaluating the importance of the
government's interest is certainly the nature and seriousness of the crime under
investigation. As the Welsh majority suggests, a legislature's treatment of an offense as
minor can fairly be said to reflect a limited governmental interest in convicting people of
that offense.").
21. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977) (per curiam) (quoting United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)).
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merits in principle are of little consequence."" Indeed, in other Fourth
Amendment contexts, the Supreme Court has cited administrability concerns
as reason to avoid adopting an offense-severity model.
Our Note seeks to remedy this shortcoming by proposing a model that uses
preexisting legislative classifications to define offense-severity for Terry
purposes. The model has two basic components. First, it distinguishes between
civil infractions or violations, on the one hand, and criminal misdemeanors and
felonies, on the other. A civil infraction or violation is a regulatory offense that
is ordinarily punishable by fine only. Because Terry spoke in terms of
proportionate government responses to suspected criminal wrongdoing, courts
should clarify that suspicion of a civil offense does not justify the intrusiveness
of a stop-and-frisk.
Second, our model deems Terry stops based on suspicion of petty offenses
presumptively invalid. For constitutional purposes, petty offenses are criminal
misdemeanors that carry a maximum possible sentence of six months in jail. 4
Applying the petty offense distinction in the Terry context makes sense because
the government's law enforcement interest is least compelling, and the
potential for harassment is greatest, when stop-and-frisks are premised on
minor suspected crimes. Adopting a rebuttable presumption for petty offenses
also helps mitigate the weightiest objections to our reliance on offense
22. Volokh, supra note 19, at 1983.
23. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 326, 347 (2001) (deeming
constitutionally reasonable a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor punishable only by fine,
explaining that " [o]ften enough, the Fourth Amendment has to be applied on the spur (and
in the heat) of the moment, and the object in implementing its command of reasonableness
is to draw standards sufficiently clear and simple to be applied with a fair prospect of
surviving judicial second-guessing"); Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 175, 178 (20o8)
(holding an arrest in violation of state law constitutionally reasonable, noting that
"[i]ncorporating state-law arrest limitations into the Constitution would produce a
constitutional regime no less vague and unpredictable than the one we rejected in Atwater.
The constitutional standard would be only as easy to apply as the underlying state law, and
state law can be complicated indeed").
24. For purposes of determining whether a defendant is constitutionally entitled to a jury trial
under the Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court has defined a "serious" crime as one for
which the authorized punishment is more than six months. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S.
66, 68-69 (1970). The Court has declined to hold that an offense carrying a maximum term
of six months or less "automatically qualifies" as petty, though it has "presume[d] for
purposes of the Sixth Amendment that society views such an offense as 'petty."' Blanton v.
City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543 (1989). Title 18 of the U.S. Code adopts the six-
month line in its definition of petty offenses. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 19, 3581(b)( 7) (2012).
Likewise, though recognizing that courts may deem some offenses punishable by less than
six months' imprisonment "serious," this Note adopts the six-month line in distinguishing
serious from petty offenses.
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categorizations -namely, that those categorizations vary across jurisdictions
and are susceptible to easy legislative manipulation.
The Note proceeds in five Parts. In Part I, we familiarize readers with Terry
and current stop-and-frisk doctrine and practice. As we show, courts have
largely avoided asking whether the offense used to justify a pedestrian Terry
stop should matter in determining its legality. In Part II, we describe offense-
severity in greater detail before setting forth our proposed model in Part III.
Part IV offers doctrinal and normative justifications for applying our model to
pedestrian stops. Finally, in Part V, we consider several state and federal court
cases that incorporate offense-severity into their Terry analyses. These cases
suggest the feasibility and utility of distinguishing among suspected offenses
when assessing the reasonableness of stop-and-frisks.26
1. STOP-AND-FRISK DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE UNDER TERRY
A. Stop-and-Frisk Doctrine
Ordinarily, a lawful warrantless search or seizure requires that officers have
probable cause to believe that an offense has been, is being, or will be
committed. 7 Terry famously departed from this standard by recognizing the
constitutionality of stop-and-frisks where officers possess merely a reasonable
and particularized suspicion of criminal wrongdoing.
Given the Court's "agonized opinion,"29 there was ample reason to believe
Terry would be limited to its operative facts, namely those situations where
25. See infra Part IV. As we explain therein, adopting the petty offense distinction helps mitigate
these criticisms because (i) there is greater uniformity across jurisdictions in the type of
behavior that qualifies as petty, and (ii) legislatures are unlikely to recategorize petty
offenses as serious because doing so would be prohibitively expensive.
26. We note our focus on pedestrian, as opposed to automobile, stops. Automobile stops
implicate special regulatory and officer safety concerns. For instance, the Supreme Court has
historically afforded motorists lesser privacy rights because of the "compelling governmental
need for regulation" to ensure highway safety. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392
(1985). And an officer exposes himself to greater risk during a traffic stop due to the "ready
mobility of vehicles," State v. Day, 168 P.3 d 1265, 1269 (Wash. 2007) (quoting State v.
Johnson, 909 P.2d 293, 3o6 (Wash. 1996)), and physical impediments that prevent him or
her from observing the movements of the vehicle's occupants, Mimms, 434 U.S. at io.
While there may be good reason to extend our model to traffic stops, our focus here is
limited to street encounters.
27. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 17, § 3.1(a).
28. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
29. William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, iii YALE L.J. 2137, 2152 (2002).
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officers possess reasonable suspicion of (a) an ongoing or prospective offense 30
of (b) a criminal nature1 that (c) threatens violence to persons or property.32
Indeed, in 1975, the American Law Institute adopted a similar standard in its
Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure.33 Courts have nonetheless
gradually expanded the boundaries of permissible Terry stops to include stops
for suspected past offenses,34 nonviolent drug crimes, and civil infractions.36
It is the last category that marks the least defensible expansion of Terry and the
one most at odds with traditional notions of Fourth Amendment
reasonableness. This Part offers a brief review of Terry in order to demonstrate
that incorporating offense-severity considerations into their review of stop-
and-frisks would enable courts to remain faithful to the Terry decision.
The facts of Terry are familiar. Officer Martin McFadden spotted two men
pacing up and down a street, each pausing several times to look in a shop
window.37 Suspicious the men were "casing a job," McFadden followed them a
short distance where the men met up with a third man."8 At that point,
McFadden - who was alone - initiated a stop and began to pat down the outer
clothing of one of the men, John Terry.39 This "frisk" revealed a .38-caliber
revolver in the breast pocket of Terry's overcoat. 4o
In upholding Terry's conviction, the Court recognized the impracticality of
subjecting "swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the
3o. Terry, 392 U.S. at 29.
31. Id. at 30.
32. The suspected crime in Terry was a robbery. See id. at 6 ("[Officer McFadden] suspected the
two men of 'casing a job, a stick-up' .... ); see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 153
(1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[Terry] was meant for the serious cases of imminent
danger or of harm recently perpetrated to person or property, not the conventional ones of
possessory offenses." (quoting Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30, 39 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly,
J., dissenting), rev'd, 441 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), rev'd, 407 U.S. 143 (1972))).
33. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 110.2(1)(a)(i) (1975) (permitting Terry
stops where an officer "reasonably suspects that [the suspect] has just committed, is
committing, or is about to commit a misdemeanor or felony, involving danger of forcible
injury to persons or of appropriation of or damage to property").
34. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
3s. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990).
36. See, e.g., State v. Dumas, 786 So. 2d 8o (La. 2001) (per curiam) (upholding a stop for
walking in the roadway, a municipal ordinance violation); State v. Morris, 641 P.2d 77 (Or.
1982) (upholding a stop for curfew, a noncriminal regulation).
37. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5-6.
38. Id. at 6.
39. Id. at 6-7.
40. Id. at 7. A second weapon was found on Terry's companion, Richard Chilton. Id.
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officer on the beat" to pre-enforcement review under the Warrant Clause.41 It
chose instead to analyze stop-and-frisks according to the Fourth Amendment's
general reasonableness requirement. This called for the adoption of a
proportionality test balancing the individual's liberty interest against the
government's generalized goal of "effective crime prevention and detection."42
While acknowledging the potential for abuse, 4  the Court ultimately
recognized a "narrowly drawn authority" for warrantless stops based on an
officer's reasonable suspicion.44
Though subsequent cases have added flesh to Terry's skeletal framework,
doctrinal uncertainty remains over whether offense-severity distinctions matter
in the Terry context. On the one hand, the Court has dispensed with a prime
indicator of offense-severity-an offense's potential to cause violence-by
applying Terry to possessory drug offenses45 and completed felonies.46 On the
other hand, Terry emphasizes the need to balance personal liberty interests
against governmental objectives.4 7 And the Court has explicitly left open
"whether Terry stops to investigate all past crimes, however serious, are
permitted."4' Furthermore, the Court has indicated in the automobile context,
albeit obliquely, that a stop for a civil traffic infraction requires probable
cause.49
In other Fourth Amendment contexts, the Court has generally declined to
incorporate crime-severity in its reasonableness calculus. In Atwater v. City of
Lago Vista, for instance, it made no difference that the seizure involved an
arrest for a nonjailable petty misdemeanor. 0 Likewise, in New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
41. Id. at 20.
42. Id. at 22.
43. Id. at 14 & n.11.
44. Id. at 27.
45. E.g., Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990).
46. E.g., United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
47. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 ("[T]here is 'no ready test for determining reasonableness other than
by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure]
entails."' (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967))).
48. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 229 (emphasis added).
49. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413 (1997) (implying that a traffic stop must be
supported by probable cause); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 81o (1996) ("As a
general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have
probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred."). Lower courts have
nonetheless repeatedly upheld such traffic stops on the lesser reasonable suspicion standard.
See, e.g., United States v. Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284, 1286 (loth Cir. 2001); Lanigan v. Vill. of
E. Hazel Crest, 1no F.3d 467, 473 (7th Cir. 1997).
50. 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
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the Court upheld as reasonable a school administrator's search of a student's
purse based on nothing more than the administrator's suspicion that the
student was violating a school rule against smoking.' And more recently, the
Court held constitutionally permissible an invasive strip search of an individual
detained for a minor offense involving the nonpayment of a fine.
But at times, the Court has viewed offense-severity as highly relevant to its
determination of reasonableness. In Welsh v. Wisconsin, for instance, the Court
noted that "an important factor to be considered when determining whether
any exigency exists" that would justify a warrantless home arrest "is the gravity
of the underlying offense for which the arrest is being made."" Welsh involved
a warrantless entry where officers had probable cause to believe the home's
occupant had recently engaged in drunk driving. 4 The Court specifically
rejected the state's exigent circumstances argument, namely that its law
enforcement needs necessitated immediate entry to the home to prevent the
spoliation of blood alcohol evidence. Under Wisconsin law, the Court noted,
driving under the influence was a "noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for
which no imprisonment [was] possible." The Court explained that "[t]his is
the best indication of the State's interest in precipitating an arrest, and is one
that can be easily identified both by the courts and by officers faced with a
decision to arrest."56 Ultimately, the Court concluded that Wisconsin's
minimal law enforcement interest did not trump the petitioner's reasonable
expectation of privacy in his own home.
In a development that underscores how perceptions of crime-severity can
shift over time, this Term the Court heard argument in a case where California
urged precisely the opposite outcome.57 The case involves a motor vehicle stop
for suspicion of drunk driving based solely on an anonymous tip.ss California
contends that because drunk driving poses such a serious threat to public safety,
51. 469 U.S. 325 (1985)-
52. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012).
53. 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984).
54. Id. at 742-43.
ss. Id. at 754.
56. Id. See also id. at 754 n.14 ("Given that the classification of state crimes differs widely among
the States, the penalty that may attach to any particular offense seems to provide the clearest
and most consistent indication of the State's interest in arresting individuals suspected of
committing that offense.").
57. Navarette v. California, No. 12-9490 (U.S. argued Jan. 21, 2014).
s8. Brief for Respondent at i, Navarette (No. 12-9490).
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ordinary Fourth Amendment requirements for corroborating anonymous tips
should be relaxed.59
There is still room, then, for arguing that crime-severity ought to matter
for Fourth Amendment purposes, despite the clear trend away from such
considerations in the Court's recent jurisprudence. Our proposed model
therefore has the potential to influence how courts, legislators, and litigants
conceive of Terry's boundaries going forward.
B. Stop-and-Frisk Practice
As currently practiced, stop-and-frisk knows few legal boundaries. So long
as some law makes the suspected conduct illegal, most courts have deemed the
stop and resulting frisk valid. Indeed, lower courts routinely uphold stop-and-
frisks for even the most minor offenses so long as an officer can articulate a
reasonable suspicion.6o Only rarely has a court paused to ask the obvious
question-reasonable suspicion of what?61 Therefore, the law today "places
only the lightest of limits on whether a suspect can be seized, and nearly no
limits at all on how. "62
Take New York, for example. A 1999 report by New York's Office of the
Attorney General (OAG) found that more than ten percent of NYPD Terry
stops were for "low-level" quality of life and misdemeanor offenses.63 As the
59. Id. at 10-25.
6o. See, e.g., State v. Stevens, 394 N.W.2d 388 (Iowa 1986) (upholding a stop for public
intoxication, a misdemeanor); State v. Dumas, 786 So. 2d 80 (La. 2001) (per curiam)
(upholding a stop for walking in the roadway, a municipal ordinance violation); State v.
Morris, 641 P.2d 77 (Or. 1982) (upholding a stop for curfew, a noncriminal regulation); Ste-
Marie v. State, 32 S.W.3d 446 (Tex. App. 2000) (upholding a stop for disorderly conduct
due to use of profane language, a misdemeanor). Public intoxication is a simple
misdemeanor in Iowa, punishable by a maximum thirty day sentence, IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 903.1 (West 2003); walking in the roadway is a violation under Louisiana municipal
ordinances, SHREVEPORT, LA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1-14 (2013), the maximum
punishment being a fine and imprisonment for not more than sixty days, State v. Dumas,
750 So. 2d 439, 441 & n.1 (La. Ct. App. 2000); disorderly conduct is a Class C misdemeanor
in Texas, punishable by fine only, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 12.23, 42.01 (West 2011).
61. See, e.g., State v. Duvernoy, 195 S.E.2d 631, 636 (W. Va. 1973) ("[W]e do not feel that the
doctrine announced in Terry . . . extends to the type of non-violent criminal activity as
involved in marijuana violations or other crimes traditionally associated as being non-
violent in nature.").
62. Stuntz, supra note 29, at 2170.
63. OAG REPORT, supra note 4, at 58. The OAG's report suggests NYPD officers may have
underreported the number of stops conducted for violations. Id. at 58 n.43 ("In April [of
1999], Police Commissioner Safir stated that 'stop, question and frisk' is usually
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OAG's report noted, "because low-level 'quality of life' and misdemeanor
offenses are more likely to be committed in the open, . . . the 'reasonable
suspicion' standard may be more readily satisfied as to those sorts of crimes."64
Several of the offenses cited in the OAG's report are violation-level
offenses. Under New York's Penal Code, violations are considered civil rather
than criminal. 6 6 Because New York law explicitly limits an officer's stop-and-
frisk authority to instances where he or she "reasonably suspects [a] person is
committing, has committed or is about to commit either (a) a felony or (b) a
misdemeanor," violations cannot serve as a lawful basis for a stop-and-frisk.6
Hence, it appears that NYPD officers regularly violated New York law during
the 1990s by making such stops.
More recent circumstantial data suggest stops on suspicion of violation-
level behavior remain commonplace. For every stop, NYPD officers must
complete a form-the Unified Form 250 (UF-2 50)-that identifies the
suspected crime.6 ' The form instructs officers to indicate the particular
suspected misdemeanor or felony that serves as the basis for each stop.
Between 2004 and 2009, the number of UF-250s that failed to state a suspected
offense rose from 1% to 36%.6 Over the same period, the total number of
stops increased 83%, from 314,000 to 576,000.70 Slightly more than 6% of
those stops resulted only in the issuance of a summons.7 ' Although it is
conceivable that in each and every one of those stops officers legitimately
'unnecessary' where a violation level offense has been committed in an officer's presence.
Commissioner Safir explained that, where an officer observes a violation, no 'stop' is
necessary; a summary arrest may be effected. To that extent, it may be reasonable to infer
that some number of 'stops' for suspected 'quality of life' violations actually resulted in
'summary arrest' -and thus were not documented as 'stop' encounters at all." (citation
omitted)).
64. Id. at 57.
65. See id. at 141-42 tbl.II.A.i (listing "Suspected Alcohol Consumption / Open Bottle,"
"Suspected Trespassing," "Administrative Code Violations," and "Loitering on Subway
Platform for Extended Period").
66. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 10.00(3) (McKinney 2013).
67. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW 5140.50(1) (McKinney 2013).
68. In 2002, the NYPD substantially revised the UF-250 in response to a federal civil rights
lawsuit. Floyd v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 1034, 2013 WL 4046209, at *75 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 12, 2013) (attaching a copy of a UF-250). The current form explicitly directs officers to
list a suspected misdemeanor or felony offense. Compare id., with OAG REPORT, supra note
4, at 90 (asking officers to list the "crime suspected").
69. Floyd, 2013 WL 4046209, at *4
70. Id. at *13.
71. Id. at *13 n.112 (citing a 201o report by Jeffrey Fagan).
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suspected criminal activity but found evidence of violations only, that
hypothesis seems dubious, particularly in light of other evidence.
Consider, for example, an audio recording played during the Floyd trial of a
conversation between a patrolman and his commanding officer. "We go out
there and we summons people," Deputy Inspector Christopher McCormack
told Officer Pedro Serrano.72 McCormack further instructed Serrano that the
way to prevent violent crime was to stop, question, and frisk "the right people
at the right time, the right location."73 When asked who the "right" people
were, Inspector McCormack, in reference to a report of earlier criminal activity,
responded that "[t]he problem was, what, male blacks . . . . I told you at roll
call, and I have no problem telling you this, male blacks 14 to 20, 21."74
In her opinion declaring the NYPD's stop-and-frisk policy
unconstitutional, Judge Scheindlin provided further examples of officers
emphasizing the importance of issuing summonses for violation-level offenses.
She noted that "[b]etween 2002 and 2011, the number of stops increased from
roughly 97,000 to roughly 686,ooo per year."75 How was it possible, the judge
wondered, that the NYPD was able to increase stops by "roughly 700%,
despite the fact that crime continued to fall during this period?"76 In answering
her own question, she noted the following statements of NYPD supervisors:
* "If they're on a corner, make them move. They don't want to
move, you lock them up. Done deal. You can always articulate
later. "77
* "Shake everybody up. Anybody moving, anybody coming out that
building, 250, verticals, and give me a couple of community visits.
C-summons as well."78
* "[G]o crazy . . . . If we get every single summons in St. Mary's
[Park], I don't care."79
72. Joseph Goldstein, Recording Points to Race Factor in Stops by New York Police, Mar. 21,




75. Floyd, 2013 WL 4046209, at *26.
76. Id.
77. Id. at *30 (statement of Sergeant Raymond Stukes).
78. Id.
79. Id. at *31 (statement of Lieutenant Stacy Barrett).
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That officers appear to stop people on suspicion of violations is perhaps
unsurprising when one considers the contradictory testimony that NYPD
supervisors have given concerning the legality of such conduct. In 1998, one
NYPD commissioner accurately testified before the New York City Council
that "violation-level offenses cannot lawfully support a forcible 'stop."'so But in
the more recent Floyd litigation, an NYPD Inspector responded to a similar
question by stating that it was his belief that officers could lawfully stop,
question, and frisk based on their suspicion of "any violation of law," not just
misdemeanors or felonies."
Such attitudes are not NYPD-specific. For example, in training their
officers on proper stop-and-frisk tactics, Philadelphia police supervisors
similarly "encourage officers to be clever and resourceful about using even
minor infractions -something as routine as spitting, littering, loitering, or
holding an open container of alcohol -as a rationale to stop a suspect person
and conduct a legal frisk.""
Because post hoc rationalizations matter a great deal in determining the
legality of Terry stops, order-maintenance policing is premised on the idea that
officers need only point to facts reasonably suggestive of some legal
wrongdoing to satisfy the constitutional standard, and it is clear that low-level
offense conduct provides the articulated justification for many stop-and-frisks.
What has also become clear is that such justifications are just that-articulated.
As Inspector McCormack's comments lay bare, using low-level offenses to
8o. OAG REPORT, supra note 4, at 53 1-32 (citing Statement of Police Commissioner Howard
Safir Before the New York City Council Public Safety Committee, Apr. 19, 1999).
81. Inspector Dwayne Montgomery testified as follows:
A. I would like to clarify one of my previous answers.
Q Sure.
A. The one relative to stopping a person for a felony or misdemeanor as defined
in the Penal Law. We can stop for any violation of law. However, we only prepare
the UF25o for the misdemeanor or a felony. If we stop for a violation, we prepare,
issue a summons.
Q. Okay. Let me clarify that. So is it your understanding that an officer can stop,
question, and frisk somebody if they have a reasonable suspicion that they have
committed a violation, misdemeanor, or a felony? Is that your understanding?
A. Yes.
Hearing Transcript at 1574, Floyd, No. o8 Civ. 1034, http://ccrjustice.org/files/3_29_2013
FloydTranscript.pdf.
82. Andrew Maykuth, Phila. Police Look for Right Touch: With Stop-and-Frisk Beginning Soon,
Officers Are Getting Some Coaching, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 14, 2008, http://articles.philly
.com/2008-04-14/news/25252795_1-illegal-weapons-officers-violent-crime.
1461
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
justify Terry stops tends to mask more invidious reasons for stop-and-frisks,
such as racial profiling."
C. The Path Not Taken
As Professor Sherry Colb reminds us, things need not have turned out this
way.5 4 Justice Harlan penned a concurrence in Terry that, had it been followed
by lower courts with greater regularity, might have averted many present-day
problems.* Instead of scrutinizing the reasonableness of the frisk, Harlan
emphasized the need for lower courts to engage in a searching inquiry of the
propriety of the initial stop. He explained that "if the frisk is justified in order
to protect the officer during an encounter with a citizen, the officer must first
have constitutional grounds to insist on an encounter, to make a forcible
stop."" Of course, "[a]ny person, including a policeman, is at liberty to avoid a
person he considers dangerous."7 Justice Harlan would have therefore made
clear that "the right to frisk ... depends upon the reasonableness of a forcible
stop to investigate a suspected crime.""
Here, then, is an implicit justification for according offense-severity
significant weight in Fourth Amendment balancing. Put slightly differently,
the police should not be permitted to use suspicion of minor offenses to engage
in fishing expeditions aimed at ferreting out the armed and potentially
dangerous. As Judge Friendly explained in unsuccessfully resisting Terry's
extension to suspected narcotics possession:
Terry v. Ohio was intended to free a police officer from the rigidity of a
rule that would prevent his doing anything to a man reasonably
suspected of being about to commit or having just committed a crime
of violence, no matter how grave the problem or impelling the need for
swift action, unless the officer had what a court would later determine
to be probable cause for arrest. It was meant for the serious cases of
83. Statistics confirm what Inspector McCormack's instructions suggest: minorities in
New York are disproportionately subjected to Terry stops. Stop-and-Frisk: Fagan
Report Summary, CENTER FOR CONST. RTs. 1 (Oct. 2010), http://ccrjustice.org/files
/Fagan%2oReport%20Summary%2oFinal.pdf.
84. Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension ofFourth Amendment "Reasonableness," 98 COLUM.
L. REv. 1642, 1691-94 (1998).
85. See id.
86. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 32 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 33.
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imminent danger or of harm recently perpetrated to persons or
property, not the conventional ones of possessory offenses.9
On the other hand, where the police have a reasonable basis for suspecting a
serious crime is about to be committed, the law ought to permit them to act
aggressively with a view towards officer safety. In Justice Harlan's words,
"[t]here is no reason why an officer, rightfully but forcibly confronting a
person suspected of a serious crime, should have to ask one question and take
the risk that the answer might be a bullet."9 o
II. WHAT'S IN A LABEL?: UNDERSTANDING OFFENSE-SEVERITY
DISTINCTIONS
Justice Harlan's concurrence raises the obvious question: what is a
"serious" offense? One possible way of approaching the question is to begin by
defining what a serious offense is not. Accordingly, our task in this Part and
Part III is, first, to describe how legislatures distinguish among offenses, and
second, to explain why those distinctions are worthy of deference for Fourth
Amendment purposes.
A. Offense Distinctions
All states distinguish between serious and minor crimes in some way.9' The
most common and recognizable distinction is between misdemeanors and
felonies. Historically at common law, felonies were those crimes for which
death and forfeiture were the prescribed punishments.9 2 All other crimes were
considered misdemeanors. Today, jurisdictions distinguish between felonies
and misdemeanors primarily by the length of the authorized punishment and
the place of incarceration. Generally speaking, felonies are those offenses that
are punishable by more than one year in the state penitentiary.93
89. Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30, 39 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., dissenting), rev'd, 441 F.2d
394 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), rev'd, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
go. Terry, 392 U.S. at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring).
91. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ATREATISE § 1.8(b) (3d ed. 2007).
92. Will Tress, Unintended Collateral Consequences: Defining Felony in the Early American Republic,
57 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 461, 463-65 (2009). Common law felonies included murder,
manslaughter, arson, burglary, robbery, rape, sodomy, mayhem, and larceny. Id. at 465
11.26.
93. 1 LAFAVEETAL.,supra note 91, 5 1.8(c).
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Misdemeanors, by contrast, encompass less serious crimes that are punishable
by fines only or jail sentences of less than one year.94
Federal law and many state penal codes further distinguish some
misdemeanors as "petty."95 While statutory codes differ in precisely where they
draw the line between petty and serious offenses, for constitutional purposes
the Supreme Court in Baldwin v. New York defined a "serious" crime as one
where the authorized term of imprisonment exceeds six months.96 Prior to its
Baldwin holding, the Court had struggled in its efforts to distinguish petty
from serious crimes, variously looking to factors like the authorized term of
punishment, the crime's character as malum in se or malum prohibitum, and
whether the offense was indictable at common law.97 In Baldwin, the Court
rejected prior approaches and simply created a constitutional floor where the
crime charged authorized a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six
months.9' This followed from the Court's recognition that every jurisdiction
save New York City afforded defendants the right to a jury trial in such
instances.99 While the Court has since declined to hold that an offense carrying
a maximum term of six months or less "automatically qualifies" as petty, it has
"presume[d] for purposes of the Sixth Amendment that society views such an
offense as 'petty."'100
Many jurisdictions have adopted another category of offenses, commonly
labeled violations or infractions.' These are considered civil, rather than
94. Id.
9s. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 19, 3571(b)( 7 ) (2012); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-2-101 (West
2013); OHIO R. CIuM. P. 2(d)).
96. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970).
97. Robert P. Connolly, The Petty Offense Exception and the Right to a Jury Trial, 48 FoRuHAM L.
REV. 205, 213 (1979).
98. 399 U.S. at 69.
99. Id. at 71-72 ("In the entire Nation, New York City alone denies an accused the right to
interpose between himself and a possible prison term of over six months, the commonsense
judgment of a jury of his peers.").
100. Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543 (1989).
101. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(9) (2012) (classifying as infractions all offenses with maximum
sentences of five days or less); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 556.021 (West 2010) ("An offense defined
by this code or by any other statute of this state constitutes an infraction if it is so designated
or if no other sentence than a fine, or fine and forfeiture or other civil penalty is authorized
upon conviction."); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 10.00(3) (McKinney 2013) ("'Violation' means an
offense, other than a 'traffic infraction,' for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in
excess of fifteen days cannot be imposed."); OR. REV. STAT. § 153.oo8 (2011) ("[A]n offense
is a violation if any of the following apply: [listing bases including statutory designation,
fine-only penalties, or prosecutorial/judicial discretion to treat as violation].").
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criminal, offenses."o2 Significantly, civil offenses usually lack the social stigma
and collateral consequences associated with misdemeanor and felony
offenses.10 3 While in some states violations may be theoretically punishable by
short jail terms,o4 many states punish violations with fines only. 05 In
Connecticut, for example, littering, vandalism, simple trespass, and possessing
an open container of alcohol in public are all fine-only violations."o'
Connecticut has also joined several states in decriminalizing marijuana
possession.107
Federal and state legislatures are not the only actors that define offense-
severity. Municipalities also exercise considerable regulatory control by virtue
of either their inherent police powers or special legislative grants of
authority.'os Traditionally, courts treated municipal ordinances as creating
quasi-criminal offenses, describing them as "public torts," "public welfare,"
"4police," or "regulatory" offenses.'0o The modern trend has been to
characterize an offense as civil or criminal based on the penalty the ordinance
authorizes or whether the ordinance has a counterpart in the state criminal
code."0 Indeed, some states have explicitly empowered municipalities to
102. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. 5 556.021 ("An infraction does not constitute a crime and
conviction of an infraction shall not give rise to any disability or legal disadvantage based on
conviction of a crime."); OR. REV. STAT. 5 153.oo8(2) ("Conviction of a violation does not
give rise to any disability or legal disadvantage based on conviction of a crime.").
103. See, e.g., PRovo, UTAH, CODE § 9.17.010 (2013) ("Provo City enacts this Chapter 9.17 of the
Provo City Code with the intent to decriminalize, where possible, violations of municipal
law which have traditionally been regulated by the criminal laws. This is done to assist
residents of Provo City, and others, by expediting the resolution of cases and to remove the
social stigma attached to criminal actions."); Christine Tramontano, A Practitioner's Guide to
Collateral Consequences of Conviction, JUST. ACTION CENTER 21, 23 (20o6), http://www.nyls
.edu/documents/justice-action-center/student-capstone-journal/capstoneoso603.pdf.
104. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw § 10.00(3) (permitting sentences of up to fifteen days in jail for
violations).
105. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-205 (West 2013) ("A person convicted of an infraction
may not be imprisoned but may be subject to a fine, forfeiture, and disqualification, or any
combination.").
1o6. Chart A: Mail-in Violations and Infractions Schedule Penalties to Be Accepted by the Centralized
Infractions Bureau Effective October 1, 2013 (Unless Otherwise Noted), JUD. BRANCH, STATE OF
CONN. (2013), http://www.jud.ct.gov/Publications/Infractions/CRoo3B chartAB.pdf.
107. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-279a(a) (2013).
io8. See generally Wayne A. Logan, The Shadow Criminal Law of Municipal Governance, 62 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1409 (2001) (providing an overview of municipal criminal law).
iog. Id. at 1414 n.28.
11o. 1 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 91, §1.8(d).
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choose whether municipal offenses should be classified as misdemeanors or
infractions."
B. Legislative Choices
This Section considers the factors that motivate legislatures -including
municipalities - in choosing among offense classifications. Classification
choices affect more than just the punishment an offender receives. They also
help determine the symbolic meaning that society attaches to the offense
conduct, the procedural rights to which a suspect or defendant is entitled, and
the collateral consequences that result from a finding of guilt.
Criminal laws, like all laws, reflect communal judgments about social
norms and social utility." 2 Those judgments are historically contingent and are
shaped by prevailing cultural attitudes and technology."' Laws prohibiting
sodomy and alcohol consumption are representative of the former; the
enactment of Internet-crimes legislation typifies the latter.
They also serve expressive and instrumental purposes.114 At a
commonsense level, the maximum authorized punishment for an offense
reflects its severity."' But categorical labels add a further layer of meaning.
Civil offenses carry less opprobrium than do criminal ones, and petty
misdemeanors are likewise perceived as less serious than other misdemeanors
and felonies. Civil sanctions are generally nonpunitive. Misdemeanors and
felonies, on the other hand, have traditionally signaled society's judgment that
the offender has violated not only its social order, but its moral norms as
well."
iii. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-3-703 (West 2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 197 1(b) (2013).
But see State ex rel. Keefe v. Schmiege, 28 N.W.2d 345 (Wis. 1947) (declaring that the state
was not empowered to delegate punishment by incarceration to municipalities except for
failure to pay fines).
m2. For general discussions, see Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L.
REV. 223 (2007); John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawfiul" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the
Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193 (1991); and
Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law,
101 YALE L.J. 1795 (1992).
113. Brown, supra note 112, at 234.
114. Logan, supra note 108, at 1439.
115. See, e.g., Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 754 n.14 (1984) ("[T]he penalty that may attach
to any particular offense seems to provide the clearest and most consistent indication of the
State's interest in arresting individuals suspected of committing that offense.").
ii6. See, e.g., Donald Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906, 936 (1986) ("To a significant
degree, the severity of the sanction expresses the importance of the violated norm.").
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Offense classifications also serve an instrumental purpose by defining the
scope of procedural rights afforded to suspects or defendants. Distinctions
between criminal and civil offenses, or between completed felonies and
completed misdemeanors, can shape the police's investigatory authority.117
Similarly, many jurisdictions continue to adhere to the common law division
between warrantless arrests for felonies and misdemeanors." 8 The former
require only probable cause whereas the latter require that the offense actually
be committed in the officer's presence. And a host of post-arrest procedural
rights are grounded on the nature of the offense charged, including rights to
counsel,1 9 grand jury indictment, 2 o and jury trial.'
Because the rights of defendants are contingent upon offense
classifications, legislative choices reflect decisions about resource allocation. For
instance, legislatures have reaped significant cost savings by reclassifying
certain misdemeanors as violations.1 2 2 Similarly, the six-month demarcation for
petty offenses exercises a strong pull in favor of petty offense classifications
because, by designating offenses as petty, legislatures can avoid the costs
associated with jury trials and, potentially, court-appointed counsel.2 3
Finally, while it is true that Fourth Amendment law generally treats all
offenses alike, courts have occasionally accorded crime-severity significant
117. See infra Part V; see also United States v. Grigg, 498 F. 3d 1070, 1077 ( 9 th Cir. 2007)
(describing the relationship between investigatory authority and the gravity of an offense).
118. 1LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 91, 5 3.5(a).
119. See Scott v. Illinois, 44o U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (holding that no right to counsel exists absent
the possibility of "actual imprisonment").
120. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that an offense other than a felony may be
prosecuted by information or complaint (in the case of a misdemeanor) or citation or
violation notice (in the case of a petty offense), as opposed to by indictment. FED. R. CRIM.
P. 7(a), 58(b)(1).
121. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73 (1970) (guaranteeing a jury trial in cases where
the accused faces more than six months' imprisonment).
122. See generally THE SPANGENBERG PROJECT, AN UPDATE ON STATE EFFORTS IN MISDEMEANOR
RECLASSIFICATION, PENALTY REDUCTION AND ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING (2010) (describing
state decriminalization efforts and the attendant savings).
123. Appointed counsel is not required where there is no threat of "actual imprisonment." Scott,
44o U.S. at 373. While some states have gone beyond Scott's minimal requirements by
providing counsel in all criminal cases, see, e.g., N.Y. CRIM, PRoc. LAW § 170.10(3)(c)
(McKinney 2013), others have remained wedded to the "actual imprisonment" standard, see,
e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-3-10 (2013) (affording representation only for those "entitled to
counsel under the Constitution of the United States"); OHIO R. CRiM. P. 44(B) (making
assignment of counsel discretionary for petty offenses so long as the court does not impose a
sentence of confinement).
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weight in determining the reasonableness of police and prosecutorial actions.124
In the next Part, we aim to encourage such efforts by proposing a model for
stop-and-frisks that incorporates offense-severity.
III. AN OFFENSE-SEVERITY MODEL FOR STOP-AND-FRISKS
It is easy to forget that Terry itself embraced the principle of
proportionality.' 5 That is to say, Terry was grounded on the idea that the
government's burden in justifying a search or seizure should be inversely
proportional to the law enforcement interest in effectuating that search or
seizure. Unfortunately, the Court has applied the proportionality principle in
its Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiries only infrequently since
Terry.12 6
Our model calls for a return to Terry's fundamental principle by
encouraging courts to explicitly incorporate offense-severity into their analyses
of stop-and-frisks. The model's underlying premises are twofold. First,
because legislative offense classifications represent considered democratic
judgments about offense-severity, they are entitled to substantial deference.
Second, the strength of the government's law enforcement interest depends on
the severity of the underlying crime that it is seeking to detect or prevent.
We think these premises represent a commonsense understanding of
reasonableness capable of accommodating both the dignitary and privacy
interests of individuals as well as the legitimate needs of law enforcement. But
we also recognize that the utility of our proposal depends on its ease of
application. To that end, in this Part we offer a brief description of how our
model would work in practice.
Under our model, a court reviewing a pedestrian stop would begin by
identifying the suspected offense and how the relevant jurisdiction categorizes
it. Significantly, it would do so prior to interrogating the objective
reasonableness of the particularized facts cited in support of the officer's
actions. Where the offense in question is a civil violation or infraction, the
court would deem the stop and any subsequent frisk unjustified, and its work
would come to an end. To be sure, if there were debate as to whether the stop
was based on reasonable suspicion or probable cause, the court would need to
124. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 74o (1984).
125. See Christopher Slobogin, Let's Not Bury Terry: A Callfor Rejuvenation of the Proportionality
Principle, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1053 (1998) (recognizing Terry's reliance on proportionality
analysis).
126. Butsee Welsh, 466 U.S. 74o.
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inquire into the facts surrounding the stop. But stops based on the mere
suspicion of noncriminal behavior would be categorically invalid.
In contrast, if the offense in question met the constitutional definition of a
petty misdemeanor, the stop or stop-and-frisk would be deemed presumptively
invalid. To overcome this presumption, the prosecution would bear the burden
of demonstrating that the officer reasonably believed the suspected offense
posed an immediate threat to public safety.'2 7 Accordingly, a court following
our model would only proceed to consider the objective and particularized facts
underlying the basis of a stop-and-frisk in three scenarios: (i) where there is a
dispute as to whether the officer had reasonable suspicion or probable cause;
(ii) where the officer claims that a suspected petty misdemeanor constituted an
immediate threat to public safety; or (iii) where the suspected crime was a non-
petty misdemeanor or felony. The penalties attached to the latter crimes are
prima facie evidence of their severity and the substantial law enforcement
interest in combating them.
Our offense-severity model would also apply to an officer's decision to frisk
a suspect. While the stop and the frisk involve analytically distinct inquiries,
courts routinely consider the nature of the suspected offense as a factor in the
frisk analysis -as they should.2' But they typically treat offense-severity as a
one-way ratchet that permits officers to automatically frisk where the suspected
crime is one in which the suspect is likely to be armed and dangerous.'"9 Our
proposal encourages courts to treat frisk justifications with greater skepticism
where the suspected offense is minor. Logically, the offense that gives rise to a
stop ought to inform the reasonableness of an officer's fear that a suspect is
armed and dangerous.
Consistent with current case law, our model would primarily apply to stops
that are initiated on the basis of reasonable suspicion rather than probable
127. Several authors, citing the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221
(1985), have proposed a similar test for all completed, rather than ongoing (as we propose),
misdemeanors. See, e.g., Rachel S. Weiss, Note, Defining the Contours of United States v.
Hensley: Limiting the Use of Terry Stops for Completed Misdemeanors, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1321
(2009). These authors appear to assume -wrongly in our opinion -that stops for suspected
ongoing misdemeanors are per se reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. In fact, the
Supreme Court has never addressed whether a Terry stop for a suspected misdemeanor, let
alone a petty one, is reasonable. For a description of how lower courts have handled this
issue, see infra Part V.
128. See, e.g., United States v. Flatter, 456 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 2006) ("We also consider the
nature of the crime suspected; indeed, some crimes are so frequently associated with
weapons that the mere suspicion that an individual has committed them justifies a pat down
search.").
129. See, e.g., United States v. Post, 607 F.2d 847, 851 ( 9th Cir. 1979).
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cause. A police officer who witnesses a civil infraction has probable cause to
either temporarily detain the suspect for the purpose of issuing a citation or,
where permitted, effectuate an arrest.o Our proposal respects that power.
However, in jurisdictions where the legislature has not authorized arrest for
violations and infractions, even where committed in an officer's presence, frisks
would be subject to a rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness.
IV. DOCTRINAL AND NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR OUR
OFFENSE-SEVERITY MODEL
In this Part we argue that our model offers a practical mechanism for
incorporating offense-severity into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, finds
support in Terry and its progeny, and is buttressed by a number of public
policy considerations. Our model assumes added importance in light of recent
moves by state legislatures to decriminalize marijuana possession and other
minor offenses."
Post-Terry, courts and scholars have disagreed on whether and how to
assess the severity of an offense when determining Fourth Amendment
reasonableness. As described in Part I, the Supreme Court has generally
refused to define the reasonableness of a search or seizure according to the
severity of the offense at issue. '3 In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, for example,
the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid warrantless arrests
for even minor crimes, such as nonjailable seatbelt violations.'33 In the rare
instances where the Court has offered an explanation for its decision to forgo
crime-severity analysis, it has focused on administrability problems. The
Court's concerns are threefold: first, courts have no principled way of dividing
serious crimes from minor ones;3 4 second, officers on the street cannot be
expected to distinguish categories of crime;s35 and third, even if officers could
130. 1 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 91, § 3.5(a).
131. Marijuana Resource Center: State Laws Related to Marijuana, OFF. NAT'L DRUG CONTROL
POL'Y, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/state-laws-related-to-marijuana (last visited
Jan. 23, 2014).
132. See Bellin, supra note 19, at 8-13.
133. 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 8o6 (1996) (holding the
detention of a motorist based on a minor traffic infraction permissible).
134. See, e.g., Whren, 517 U.S. at 818 (claiming there is "no principle" that would enable courts to
distinguish between serious criminal laws and those that are "so commonly violated that
infraction itself can no longer be the ordinary measure of the lawfulness of enforcement").
135. See, e.g., Atwater, 532 U.S. at 348 (rejecting a proposed crime-severity framework based on
penalty severity because "[i]t is not merely that we cannot expect every police officer to
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differentiate between crimes in a broad sense, they cannot be expected to
master the subtle distinctions of complex penalty schemes, such as whether
"the weight of the marijuana [is] a gram above or a gram below the fine-only
line."136
Scholars insist, on the other hand, that it is problematic to treat all offenses
identically.137 But they cannot agree on how or where to draw the lines.
Professor Jeffrey Bellin, for example, has argued for the classification of crimes
into "grave," "serious," and "minor."13 Under Bellin's formulation, courts
"channeling the views of a hypothetical reasonable person" would make these
determinations.139 Yet, relying on post hoc judicial determinations poses the
very administrability problem the Supreme Court has warned about. Other
commentators to consider the issue have similarly failed to adequately address
the administrability concern. 4o
These failures are part of what makes our proposal attractive. Since our
model piggybacks on preexisting legislative classifications and a settled bright-
line constitutional rule, there is no need to worry about the inconsistencies of
ad hoc judicial lawmaking, thereby addressing the first of the Court's
administrability concerns. By contrast, given the Supreme Court's reluctance to
adopt any kind of judicially created hierarchy of crimes, scholarly proposals
that rely on judicial determinations alone are impractical.141
know the details of frequently complex penalty schemes, but that penalties for ostensibly
identical conduct can vary on account of facts difficult (if not impossible) to know at the
scene of an arrest" (citation omitted)).
136. Id. at 348-49.
137. See, e.g., Bellin, supra note 19, at 18-21; Volokh, supra note 19, at 1964-65.
138. Bellin, supra note 19, at 27.
139. Id. at 28.
140. Id. at 21 ("The most striking aspect of the literature analyzing the omission of crime severity
from Fourth Amendment balancing ... is how little exists.").
141. One objection to our approach must be confronted at the outset. In Virginia v. Moore, the
Supreme Court squarely rejected the idea that state law could determine the scope of Fourth
Amendment protections. 553 U.S. 164 (2008). Specifically, a unanimous Court held that a
search incident to arrest based on probable cause was constitutionally permissible even
though the arrest itself was illegal under state law (that is, police should have issued a
summons instead). The Court explained that "[w]hile [local law enforcement] practices
'vary from place to place and from time to time,' Fourth Amendment protections are not 'so
variable' and cannot 'be made to turn upon such trivialities."' Id. at 172 (quoting Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 8o6, 81S (1996)). How can we argue, then, that a court should defer
to legislative classifications for Terry purposes? Moore does not foreclose our argument for at
least four reasons. First, Virginia police had probable cause-not reasonable suspicion-to
believe Moore had committed a criminal misdemeanor. Second, police suspected that Moore
had committed a criminal offense. Hence, the noncriminal/criminal distinction remains a
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Likewise, under our proposal, police officers need not master a complex set
of vaguely drawn distinctions like those between "grave," "serious," and
"minor" crimes; this addresses the Court's second administrability concern. Of
course, in the real world, "officers can and regularly do make ex ante
judgments that separate one class of crimes from another, because that is an
important part of their job."14' But if, as the Supreme Court suggests, such
difficult line-drawing judgments are generally to be avoided, the distinctions
between noncriminal, petty, and serious offenses are straightforward and "can
be easily identified both by the courts and by officers faced with a decision to
[stop or] arrest." 43 Indeed, in analyzing stops for completed offenses, some
federal circuit courts already require police to distinguish misdemeanors from
felonies.144 Other courts, while declining to embrace such a bright-line rule,
have effectively adopted a presumption that officers should not stop people for
completed misdemeanors unless those misdemeanors threaten public safety.4s
If courts believe police can readily distinguish any completed misdemeanor
from a felony, there is little reason to suspect they cannot similarly distinguish
violations and petty offenses from more serious crimes.
The Court's third administrability concern-that the boundary between
offense categories is too thin-does not pose an intractable problem for our
model. For every crime, officers must know the elements of the crime in order
to initiate a proper stop. For instance, statutes decriminalizing simple
possession of marijuana specify an ounce limit; above that limit, possession
viable one, even for federal constitutional law. Third, while it is true that some variability
exists in petty offense categorizations across jurisdictions, the Court has never found such
variability unduly troubling when defining the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Nor
has it articulated a compelling justification for why Fourth Amendment rights should be
treated differently. Finally, the Court in Moore explicitly noted that states retain the ability to
impose higher standards on searches and seizures than required by the Constitution. Id. at
172. ("While '[i]ndividual States may surely construe their own constitutions as imposing
more stringent constraints on police conduct than does the Federal Constitution,' state law
d[oes] not alter the content of the Fourth Amendment." (quoting California v. Greenwood,
486 U.S. 35,43 (1988))).
142. Stuntz, supra note 19, at 852.
143. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 754 (1984).
144. See, e.g., Gaddis ex rel. Gaddis v. Redford Twp., 364 F.3 d 763, 771 n.6 (6th Cir. 2004).
145. See, e.g., United States v. Grigg, 498 F.3 d 1070, lo81 (9th Cir. 2007) ("[W]e decline to adopt
a per se standard that police may not conduct a Terry stop to investigate a person in
connection with a past completed misdemeanor simply because of the formal classification
of the offense. We think it depends on the nature of the misdemeanor. Circumstances may
arise where the police have reasonable suspicion to believe that a person is wanted in
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remains a crime. The Atwater Court made much hay of this distinction by
noting that officers executing arrests cannot be expected to know whether "the
weight of the marijuana [is] a gram above or a gram below the fine-only
line."'*6 That may be true in the arrest context, but in terms of Terry stops
based on reasonable suspicion such a concern is misplaced. Quantity is an
obvious element of the offense. In order to have reasonable suspicion of
criminal (or non-petty) activity, an officer must necessarily possess some
indication that the quantity is of a criminal (or non-petty) amount.
Importantly, that does not mean that all well-founded suspicions will turn out
to be correct.
A recent case in Massachusetts, where possession of small amounts of
marijuana has been decriminalized, deftly handled this issue.'47 We discuss the
case more fully in Part V below. Here, it is sufficient to note the court held that
where police officers have reasonable suspicion that someone possesses
marijuana, but have no indication that the amount exceeds the criminal limit,
reasonable suspicion of a crime is lacking.148 Observation of small amounts of
marijuana or detection of marijuana odor does not adequately support the
inference that an individual is engaged in criminal activity. The court's decision
implies that officers must be able to point to some indicia of quantity-an
informer's tip, visual observation by the officers, drug paraphernalia in plain
view, or even a bulge in the suspect's pants pocket-to justify reasonable
suspicion.'49
Our proposed model admittedly represents a tradeoff between crime
suppression and individual rights. After all, one of the central tenets of modern
order-maintenance policing is that minor acts of legal wrongdoing may be
indicative of more serious illegality. Notwithstanding powerfiuil criticisms of
the efficacy of order-maintenance policing,'50 we acknowledge the potential for
our model to reduce crime suppression at the margins. Such tradeoffs,
however, are generally an unavoidable aspect of criminal procedure law. As
Judge Scheindlin stated in Floyd: "Many police practices may be useful for
146. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 348-49 (2001).
147. See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d 899 (Mass. 2011).
148. Id. at 9o8.
149. At least one commentator has taken issue with Cruz's holding that odor cannot provide
reasonable suspicion. John Sullivan, Note, Reasonable Suspicion ofan Unjust Conclusion: How
Commonwealth v. Cruz Cripples Enforcement of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94 C, 5 32L, 46 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 877 (2012).
150. See, e.g., K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs ofAggressive
Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 271, 277-78 (2009)
(describing empirical research).
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fighting crime-preventive detention or coerced confessions, for example-but
because they are unconstitutional they cannot be used, no matter how
effective."' 5'
We also think this particular tradeoff is justified for doctrinal and policy
reasons. While perhaps less intrusive than other kinds of searches and seizures,
the dignitary harms to individuals subjected to a stop-and-frisk are real and
substantial. "[I]t is simply fantastic," the Terry Court wrote, "to urge that such
a procedure performed in public by a policeman while the citizen stands
helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his hands raised, is a 'petty indignity.' It is
a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great
indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken
lightly."1 5 2 That is why Terry's focus, as one state's highest court recognized,
was on "preventing crimes, and promoting the interests of justice in arresting
felons," which suggests the government's interest in preventing and
investigating lesser offenses should not be accorded the same weight.13
Beyond its doctrinal consistency, an offense-severity model is also worth
adopting for at least three public policy reasons. First, our society should aim
to close the gap between stop-and-frisk doctrine and practice that has emerged
in the decades following Terry. As one court has held, "In light of the lower risk
to society involved with civil infractions, the common law principle . . .
suggests that a less intrusive procedure would be more acceptable than with
the commission of a felony or even a misdemeanor."' 4 Our offense-severity
model aims to close the Terry gap by linking practice more faithfully with the
public and officer safety concerns that permeated the Terry opinion. Since
minor public order offenses implicate safety to a lesser degree than do criminal
offenses, public policy interests counsel against upholding such stops.
Second, embracing offense distinctions provides courts with an objective
basis for preventing law enforcement from using stop-and-frisks
pretextually. 5 As Judge Friendly noted in reference to a stop for narcotics
151. Floyd v. City of New York, No. o8 Civ. 1034, 2013 WL 4046209, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12,
2013).
152. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1968) (citation omitted). Judge Scheindlin echoed these
concerns: "While it is true that any one stop is a limited intrusion in duration and
deprivation of liberty, each stop is also a demeaning and humiliating experience. No one
should live in fear of being stopped whenever he leaves his home to go about the activities of
daily life." Floyd, 2013 WL 4046209, at *2.
153. State v. Duncan, 43 P-3 d 513, 518 (Wash. 2002).
154. Id. at 519.
155. See Christopher Slobogin, Why Crime Severity Analysis Is Not Reasonable: A Comment on
Jeffrey Bellin, Crime-Severity Distinctions and the Fourth Amendment: Reassessing
Reasonableness in a Changing World, 97 IOWAL. REv. BULL. 1, 11 (2012).
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possession, "[t]here is too much danger that, instead of the stop being the
object and the protective frisk an incident thereto, the reverse will be true." 6
Indeed, as described in Part I, critics of Terry have complained that officers
routinely engage in pretextual stops based on impermissible factors such as
race. Employing our model would help divorce stop-and-frisk procedures from
these problematic practices.
Finally, making use of offense-severity distinctions respects the considered
judgments of legislatures and voters described in Part II. Those judgments are
entitled to deference because crime control is a quintessentially local matter. As
one scholar has noted, "[i]t . . . makes intuitive sense that the substantive
definition of crimes should emanate from locals, who at once can give
expression to specific social and geographic conditions, and, as the criminal law
does more generally, single out particular behaviors for sanction." 7
There is a danger, of course, that deferring to legislative classifications will
lead to a one-way ratchet whereby legislatures transform every civil infraction
into a criminal offense, and every petty misdemeanor into a major one.
Scholars have, in fact, repeatedly accused legislatures of engaging in such
overcriminalization.15 But the opposite has actually occurred in recent years.'59
For a variety of reasons, legislatures have increasingly embraced
decriminalization."'o Hence, one of the primary criticisms of legislatures - that
they always favor expansive substantive crime definitions to the detriment of
defendants -is empirically false. Moreover, while we are not oblivious to this
danger, we do think it overstated. As the Atwater Court pointed out in refusing
to create a constitutional rule against warrantless misdemeanor arrests, it is
"only natural that States should resort to this sort of legislative regulation, for
... it is in the interest of the police to limit petty-offense arrests, which carry
costs that are simply too great to incur without good reason.""' And while the
leeway Terry has traditionally afforded officers may tip the scales slightly, it is
156. Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30, 38 (2d Cit. 1970) (Friendly, J., dissenting), rev'd, 441 F.2d
394 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), rev'd, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
157. Logan, supra note 1o8, at 1420 (footnote omitted).
i58. See, e.g., Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 Am. U. L. REV. 703, 719 (2005)
("[T]he escalation of 'law and order' politics in recent years has created a one-way ratchet in
U.S. governance . . . ."); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, loo
MICH. L. REV. 505, 509, 547 (2001) (describing the criminal law as a "one-way ratchet").
159. See Brown, supra note 112, at 225 (arguing that scholars overlook the ongoing process of
decriminalization in American criminal law).
160. See id.
161. Atwater v. City ofLago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 352 (2001).
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unlikely to be a legislature's predominant concern when considering offense
classifications.
Critics might also object that offense distinctions vary considerably among
jurisdictions. Indeed, as noted above, the Supreme Court in Moore ridiculed the
idea that "Fourth Amendment protections" could "be made to turn upon such
trivialities.116 2 Our model incorporates the constitutional petty offense line in
part to address this criticism. A general presumption against Terry stops for
petty crimes reduces offense variability while also recognizing the comparably
lesser law enforcement interest in detecting and prosecuting such crimes.
Moreover, while the lack of uniformity among jurisdictions is regrettable, such
distinctions are not altogether meaningless. Federalism embraces the idea of
localities as laboratories for experimentation.'6 3 That localities choose to define
offenses as noncriminal rather than criminal, for instance, is indicative of such
experimentation. And as the accelerating trend towards marijuana
decriminalization suggests, those who favor shrinking criminal liability often
exercise considerable influence, notwithstanding frequent scholarly claims to
the contrary.
V. APPLYING THE OFFENSE-SEVERITY MODEL
Judicial opinions are skewed towards discussing citizen-police encounters
that result in the seizure of incriminating evidence. Relying on those opinions
to analyze the constitutionality of Terry stops is therefore problematic because
it tends to highlight the tired debate of whether it is ever desirable to let the
criminal go free because the constable blundered.'6 * What often gets omitted
from the surrounding discussion are the countless searches and seizures that do
not result in the discovery of contraband. Consider that fewer than one in nine
recorded stop-and-frisks by the NYPD leads to an arrest or summons. 6 5 By
162. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 172 (20o8) (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 8o6,
81s (1996)).
163. Logan, supra note io8, at 1420.
164. The saying was coined by then-Judge Cardozo in People v. DeFoe, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y.
1926). For a discussion of the selection bias in Fourth Amendment case law, see Tonja
Jacobi, The Law, and Economics of the Exclusionary Rule, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585, 599
(2011), which explains that "[e]xclusionary rule precedent is thus developed without the
courts ever seeing all of the instances that the Amendment was primarily designed to
protect: preventing police harassment of innocent citizens."
165. Joseph Goldstein, Trial Weighs Importance of Arrests in Police Stops, N.Y. TIMES,
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any measure, that is an alarming rate of false positives for encounters based on
reasonable suspicion. And citizens victimized by such false positives suffer a real
invasion of privacy, the collective costs of which are nearly impossible to
quantify.
Because the law is nevertheless shaped by judicial opinions, our focus in
this Part is on state and federal court cases that adopt elements of our offense-
severity model. These cases demonstrate that our model provides a practical
and doctrinally sound mechanism for applying proportionality analysis in
reviewing stop-and-frisks.
A. The Noncriminal/Criminal Distinction
This Section examines two state supreme court cases that embrace a
noncriminal/criminal distinction for Terry stops. Each case stands for the
proposition that police may not engage in Terry stop-and-frisks where the
offense suspected is noncriminal in nature. As such, they represent an
important limitation on order-maintenance policing tactics.
In State v. Duncan, a stop initiated on suspicion of an open container
infraction resulted in the discovery of a gun and stolen goods.'" Seattle police
officers approached three men at a bus stop to question them about a nearby
half-empty beer bottle.'6 After smelling alcohol on one of the men, Demetrius
Duncan, the officers cited him for possession of an open container, a civil
infraction under Washington law.' Subsequently, based on the officers'
knowledge of Duncan's record and his bulky jacket, they frisked him, finding a
handgun, a stolen purse, and stolen credit cards."96 Duncan was charged with
unlawful possession of a firearm, possession of a stolen firearm, and possession
of stolen property. 7o The trial court granted his motion to suppress, but the
Washington Court of Appeals reversed.' 7'
In reinstating the trial court's order, the Supreme Court of Washington
rejected the state's invitation to "extend" the Terry exception to non-traffic civil
infractions.172 Instead, it clarified that Terry applies only to criminal behavior.
The court reasoned that because noncriminal offenses involve a lower safety
166. 43 P-3d 513 (Wash. 2002).




171. State v. Duncan, 105 Wash. App. 007 (2001), rev'd, 43 P.3 d 513 (Wash. 2002).
77z. Duncan, 43 P.3 d at 514.
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risk than criminal ones, their detection warrants a less intrusive procedure than
that sanctioned by Terry.73 Accordingly, the court found the stop
unconstitutional.174
More recently, in Commonwealth v. Cruz, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court reached a conclusion similar to Duncan in a case involving a
suspected marijuana offense. 7 1 The court held that "the lesser standard of
reasonable suspicion is tied, by its very definition, to the suspicion of criminal,
as opposed to merely infractionary, conduct." 17' The primary question in Cruz
was whether marijuana odor provided justification for officers to order the
defendant, a passenger in an illegally parked vehicle, to exit the vehicle and
submit to a search of his person. The officers in Cruz were driving down a
Boston street when they spotted a car parked in front of a fire hydrant.177 The
officers recognized the car's passenger, Benjamin Cruz, from his previous
encounters with law enforcement.175 Suspicious, the two officers pulled up
beside the driver for the ostensible purpose of investigating the civil offense. 17"
As they approached the vehicle, an officer observed Cruz smoking a cigar and
smelled a "'faint odor' of burnt marijuana."iso Based on that odor, together
with the driver's nervous behavior and statement that he had smoked
marijuana earlier that day, officers ordered both the driver and Cruz out of the
car."' Prompted by officer questioning, Cruz then acknowledged having crack
cocaine on his person12
Much like the Supreme Court of Washington in Duncan, the Cruz court
stated that "to order a passenger in a stopped vehicle to exit based merely on
suspicion of an offense, that offense must be criminal.""' The court found that,
because Massachusetts had decriminalized possession of less than one ounce of
marijuana,1"* to order Cruz to exit the vehicle, the police officers would have
173. Id. at 519.
174. Id. at 521.
175. 945 N.E.2d 899, 908 (Mass. 2011).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 902.




182. Id. at 904.
183. Id. at 908.
184. Id. at 905.
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needed reasonable suspicion that he possessed more than an ounce.ss Mere
odor, even when combined with the defendant's statement that he had smoked
earlier that day, was not sufficient.186 Consequently, the court held that the
crack cocaine should have been suppressed as the fruits of an illegal seizure. 8 7
Because the initial "stop" of the vehicle was justified by the parking
violation,' officers were permitted to ask the defendant whether he had been
smoking marijuana, but only for the purpose of issuing a civil citation.'"9
Readers may legitimately wonder about the practical implications of
Duncan and Cruz as proxies for the consequences of implementing our model
more broadly. Because Duncan was decided more than a decade ago,
Washington's experience is more revealing. On the positive side, Duncan has
not caused Washington's legislature to ratchet up its classification of minor
offenses in order to expand the scope of permissible predicates for Terry stops.
Indeed, the legislature has since authorized a ballot measure, which voters
subsequently approved, to legalize possession of small amounts of marijuana.
The Seattle Police Department (SPD), in turn, recognized that public
consumption of marijuana is merely an infraction, the policing of which
constitutes the Department's "lowest law enforcement priority."' 90
Additionally, marijuana odor does not provide probable cause for a vehicle
search.' 9' SPD recently went so far as to return confiscated marijuana to street
dealers because it fell below the legally prohibited amount.192 Duncan itself has
been followed by Washington appellate courts' 93 and extended to parking
infractions.'94 It has also been cited in the Washington Association of
Prosecuting Attorneys' manual on searches and seizures, which instructs
185. Id. at 908.
186. Id. at 910.
187. Id. at 914.
188. Id. at 905.
189. Id. at 906.
190. Jonah Spangenthal-Lee, Mariwhatnow? A Guide to Legal Marijuana Use in Seattle, SEATTLE
POLICE DEP'T: SPD BLOTTER (Nov. 9, 2012), http://spdblotter.seattle.gov/2o12/11/09
/marijwhatnow-a-guide-to-legal-marijuana-use-in-seattle.
191. Id.
192. Jake Ellison, 'First Time Ever': Seattle Police Give Marijuana Back to Suspected
Dealers, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER: POT BLOG (Apr. 4, 2013), http://blog
.seattlepi.com/marijuana/2o13/o4/o 4 /'first-time-ever'-seattle-police-give-marijuana-back-to
-suspected-dealers.
193. See, e.g., State v. Lawrence, 136 Wash. App. 1026 (2006) (finding no basis for a warrant
check where the suspected offense was a civil, rather than a criminal, violation).
194. State v. Day, 168 P-3d 1265, 1269-70 (Wash. 2007).
1479
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
prosecutors and officers that Terry stops may not be based on suspicion of non-
traffic infractions.195
On the other hand, evidence that Duncan has directly affected police
practices is lacking. That can be blamed in part on the fact that the SPD did not
keep data on Terry stops until it agreed to do so pursuant to a recent settlement
agreement with the Department of Justice (DOJ).196 Consequently, it is
impossible to compare police practices before and after Duncan. We do know,
however, that SPD policies in recent years have been troubling. The DOJ's
summary of its investigative findings states that "SPD's policy and practices
blur the line between a social contact or casual encounter, and a temporary
investigatory detention pursuant to Terry v. Ohio."1 97 It also noted that
according to a 20o9 report by SPD's Office of Professional Accountability, forty
percent of those subjected to stop-and-frisks believed officers lacked a
reasonable ground for stopping them.' 8 In recommendations for a proposed
consent decree, the ACLU similarly found a perception that SPD "engage[s] in
contacts with people of color on suspicion of minor infractions or
misdemeanors." 99 It recommended that a host of civil violations and
misdemeanors -including "jaywalking and other pedestrian infractions,
obstruction, disorderly [conduct], littering, and pedestrian interference" - be
added to SPD's "Lowest Law Enforcement Priority" list.2 oo The settlement
agreement between the city and DOJ requires SPD to revise its manual to
"prohibit investigatory stops where the officer lacks reasonable suspicion that a
person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in the commission of a crime.""2o
While this voluntary revision is welcome, SPD's history provides all the more
reason for courts to rigorously scrutinize the purported justification for Terry
stops and insist on a clear distinction between noncriminal and criminal
behavior.
195. Pamela B. Loginsky, Confessions, Search, Seizure, and Arrest: A Guide for Police Officers and
Prosecutors, WASH. Ass'N PROSECUTING ATT'Ys 89 (May 201), https://fortress.wa.gov/cjtc
/www/images/May%202o01%/2ofinal%/20SEIZURE%2oAND%2OCONFESSIONS.pdf.
196. Investigation of the Seattle Police Department, U.S. DEP'T JUST.: CIv. RTs. Div. 6 (Dec. 16,
201n), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/spd_findletter 12-16-1n.pdf.
197. Id. at 26.
198. Id. at 25.
199. Recommendations Regarding the Consent Decree Between DOJ and the City of Seattle, ACLU
WASH. 5 (Feb. 24, 2012), http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/acluwa-rees-for-consent-decree
.pdf.
200. Id.
201. Settlement Agreement and Stipulated [Proposed] Order of Resolution at 39-40, United
States v. City of Seattle, No. 12-CV-1282 (W.D. Wash. July 27, 2012).
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B. The Petty Offense Distinction
The Supreme Court has never considered whether a minor criminal offense
like a petty misdemeanor is sufficient to justify a Terry stop-and-frisk.
However, its rationale in United States v. Hensley lends some support to our
petty offense distinction. That lower federal courts and state courts have
invoked Hensley in invalidating stops for completed misdemeanors further
underscores the practical utility and doctrinal soundness of our model.
In Hensley, the Court considered a motor vehicle stop based on an officer's
reasonable suspicion of a completed felony. On December 4, 1981, two armed
men robbed a tavern in St. Bernard, Ohio. 2 ' Based on an informant's tip,
police officers issued a "wanted flyer" for Thomas Hensley for the purposes of
investigating the aggravated robbery.o 3 On December 16, 1981, police officers
spotted Hensley in a white Cadillac convertible.20 4 Confusion ensued, however,
about whether there was a warrant outstanding for Hensley's arrest, which
clearly would have permitted a stop. Before a police dispatcher could confirm
whether Hensley had an outstanding warrant, officers stopped him and
searched his car.o 5 The search produced three handguns; Hensley was
arrested, charged, and convicted of being a felon in possession of firearms.20
Prior to Hensley, the Supreme Court had not considered the lawfulness of
investigatory stops for completed, as opposed to imminent or ongoing,
crimes.20 7 The Hensley Court determined that such stops were in fact lawful,
but explicitly cabined its holding to completed felonies only.20o While declining
to define the precise limits on investigatory stops for all completed crimes,209
the Court advised that any test to identify such limits would have to balance
"the nature and quality of the intrusion on personal security against the
importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion."2"o
202. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 223 (1985).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 223-24.
205. Id. at 224-25.
206. Id.
207. See id. at 226.
208. Id. at 229 ("It is enough to say that, if police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in
specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in
connection with a completed felony, then a Terry stop may be made to investigate that
suspicion." (emphasis added)).
2og. Id. ("We need not and do not decide today whether Terry stops to investigate all past crimes,
however serious, are permitted.").
z1o. Id. at 228.
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Hensley emphasized the particular threat that felonies pose to public safety.
The Court explained that "the law enforcement interests at stake in these
circumstances outweigh the individual's interest to be free of a stop and
detention that is no more extensive than permissible in the investigation of
imminent or ongoing crimes."11" Hence, by negative implication at least, the
Court's opinion suggests minor crimes may not pose a threat significant
enough to justify Terry stop-and-frisks.
Both federal and state courts have relied on Hensley to invalidate the use of
Terry stops for completed misdemeanors. Although these cases also involve
completed offenses, their holdings similarly emphasize law enforcement's
comparably weaker interest in preventing and prosecuting misdemeanors, as
opposed to felonies.
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Grigg, for example, held that mere
suspicion of a completed misdemeanor could not justify a Terry stop when the
offense posed only a minimal threat to public safety. The case involved the
misdemeanor offense of playing a car stereo too loudly, a crime easily
distinguished from that in Hensley: "[I]t is difficult to imagine a less
threatening offense than playing one's car stereo at an excessive volume. The
absence of any danger to any person arising from the misdemeanor noise
violation here does not support detaining the suspect as promptly as
possible."2
The Grigg court acknowledged that the "nature of the misdemeanor" must
be taken into account for Fourth Amendment purposes.2 14 But it "decline[d] to
adopt a per se standard that police may not conduct a Terry stop to investigate
a person in connection with a past completed misdemeanor simply because of
211. Id.
212. 498 F. 3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2007). Circuit courts disagree as to whether a suspected completed
misdemeanor can justify a Terry stop. The Sixth Circuit has stated, albeit in dicta, that a
completed misdemeanor can never support a valid Terry stop. See Gaddis ex rel. Gaddis v.
Redford Twp., 364 F.3d 763, 771 n.6 (6th Cit. 2004). On the other hand, the Eighth and
Tenth Circuits, like the Ninth, have rejected such a categorical approach. Instead, they have
adopted a case-by-case "totality of the circumstances" test that requires officers to balance
the individual's privacy interest against the government's law enforcement objectives. See
United States v. Hughes, 517 F.3 d 1013, 1017 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Moran, 503
F.3 d 1135, 1143 (loth Cir. 2007). Regardless, even the balancing approach embraced by the
Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits takes into consideration the severity of the offense in
question.
213. Grigg, 498 F. 3d at 1076-77.
214. Id. at o81.
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the formal classification of the offense."' Instead, the court proposed a case-
by-case balancing test that considers the "totality of the circumstances.""1
State courts have reached similar conclusions regarding the significance of
offense-severity. In Blaisdell v. Commissioner of Public Safety, for example, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals invalidated the stop of a vehicle whose driver was
suspected of having committed a "no-pay" theft from a gas station.2 17 The theft
was a misdemeanor offense under Minnesota law."' Drawing on Hensley, the
court recognized that misdemeanors are inherently less severe than felonies.21 9
The court explained:
Obviously, and by definition, misdemeanor offenses are punished less
severely than gross misdemeanors or felonies. Additionally, the
legislature has provided that an officer may not make a warrantless
arrest for a misdemeanor unless the offense is committed in the officer's
presence. We consider this to be a legislative recognition that the public
concerns served by warrantless misdemeanor arrests are in some degree
outweighed by concerns for personal security and liberty. At the very
least, because misdemeanor offenses are considered less serious crimes
than felonies and because police cannot arrest for misdemeanors unless
the offense is committed in their presence, the public concerns served
by seizures to investigate past misdemeanors are less grave than the
concerns served by seizures to investigate past felonies and gross
misdemeanors.220
For these reasons, the court in Blaisdell imposed a per se rule that Terry stops
are impermissible for past crimes that do not meet the statutory definition of a
gross misdemeanor."
215. Id.
216. Id. ("An assessment of the 'public safety' factor should be considered within the totality of
the circumstances, when balancing the privacy interests at stake against the efficacy of a
Terry stop, along with the possibility that the police may have alternative means to identify
the suspect or achieve the investigative purpose of the stop.").
217. 375 N.W.2d 880 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985), affd on diferent grounds, 381 N.W. 849 (Minn.
1986).
218. Id. at 882.
219. Id. at 883.
220. Id. (citations omitted).
221. Id. at 883-84. In Minnesota, a felony is an offense punishable by more than one year in jail,
whereas a misdemeanor is an offense punishable by no more than ninety days in jail. A gross
misdemeanor is simply defined as "any crime which is not a felony or misdemeanor," i.e.,
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The distinction between completed and ongoing crimes is undoubtedly
relevant to determining whether police action is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, but it should not be courts' only, or even predominant, concern.
True, the exigencies Officer McFadden encountered in Terry are absent where
the suspected offense has already occurred."' But the government nonetheless
has a "strong interest in solving crimes and bringing offenders to justice. "223
Offense-severity seems to us a far more relevant barometer of the state's
interest in preventing and prosecuting crime than does the suspected offense's
temporal proximity to the search or seizure. And Hensley, Grigg, and Blaisdell
all recognized this role for offense-severity in analyzing the Terry stops in
question. Furthermore, while lower court decisions since Hensley have tended
to focus exclusively on the felony/misdemeanor distinction, the petty offense
distinction provides a more administrable dividing line for constitutional
purposes, as we have suggested in this Note. That is because, in contrast to the
felony/misdemeanor distinction, which the Court has previously described as
"highly technical" and "arbitrary," 224 the petty offense distinction is readily
identifiable and capable of easy implementation both on the street and in the
courtroom.
CONCLUSION
Our Note has several important implications. First, defense lawyers should
be more aggressive in challenging the lawfulness of stops based on suspicion of
infractions and other minor offenses. Our sense is that the problem is
exacerbated by the fact that much objectionable conduct escapes judicial review
entirely. Second, courts should make clear that reasonable suspicion of civil
violations does not justify Terry stops under the Fourth Amendment or
equivalent state constitutional provisions. While decisions invalidating Terry
stops on the basis of state statutes would be welcome, courts should go further
by establishing a constitutional floor below which states may not go. Third,
frisks that occur subsequent to stops for minor offenses should be subject to
heightened judicial scrutiny. Logically, the severity of an offense should inform
an officer's determination of a suspect's potential dangerousness. Finally,
opponents of stop-and-frisk practices should give serious consideration to
those offenses punishable by more than ninety days, but no more than one year, in jail.
MINN. STAT. § 609.02 (2012).
222. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228 (1985).
223. Id. at 229.
224. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 14, 20 (1985).
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lobbying state legislatures to decriminalize certain offenses - trespass,
disorderly conduct, and drug possession, for example -that commonly serve as
bases for intrusive Terry stops.
To be sure, applying an offense-severity distinction to Terry stops is not a
panacea for all that ails Fourth Amendment law. But it is a step in the right
direction. At a minimum, distinguishing merely infractionary conduct from
that which is criminal would assuage some of the concerns of Terry's
opponents. Doing so might also restore faith in the initial rationale for the
Terry exception: ensuring police are not engaged in fishing expeditions, but are
instead focused on preventing and solving the most serious crimes.
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